Foreign Policy — VOICES for REASON

The official line from Secretary of State Clinton is that we owe a debt of gratitude to Pakistan, our nominal ally, for its cooperation in the raid on the Bin Laden compound. What that “cooperation” really amounted to, remains to be seen. But this report from Dexter Filkins at The New Yorker suggests the contours of our actual relationship with Pakistan:

initial indications are that Pakistani military and intelligence officials may have provided some routine coöperation with the Americans but were not given the identity of the target. This makes sense: In recent months, American officials have stopped informing Pakistani officials ahead of time about the C.I.A.’s drone strikes against militants in the tribal areas, out of fear that they might be tipped off. (emphasis added)

That fear is well founded. Pakistani forces have in the past tipped off and given shelter to Islamist fighters.

Bin Laden’s compound was well within the borders of Pakistan (rather than in the lawless borderlands), less than a mile from a military base. Its unusual size and build make it stand out. . . . Maybe the regime had no knowledge of it (doubtful). Or, perhaps, as the evidence suggests, this news provides added reason to question whether Pakistan is an ally.

The killing of Bin Laden is a tremendous act of justice — for the victims of 9/11, for all Americans. An overdue act of justice, but a necessary and expertly conducted one nonetheless. In the last 12 hours, on lots of radio interviews, I’ve been asked: “Can we now bury the ‘war on terror’?”

No. Although Bin Laden was the the most recognized face of Islamist terrorism, al Qaeda is one, relatively recent, faction within a larger ideological-political cause: the Islamic totalitarian movement. That movement’s origins date back to the 1920s with the founding of

the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; its standard-bearer since 1979 has been the totalitarian regime in Iran. The Islamists wish to establish a global regime that subjugates all under sharia. There is disagreement within the movement on how to achieve that goal—terrorist attacks, revolutionary overthrow, lawful political subversion, running for elected office, or some combination of these.

But whatever the means adopted, their common vision necessitates expunging the freedom of individuals and negating the political principles of secular society.

It was essential that we capture or kill Bin Laden, in the name of justice, but that step alone cannot put an end to the movement. We can hope that it will demoralize some of Bin Laden’s many admirers and followers, for a while, but we should also expect someone else to emerge, hydra-like, to serve as a leader of the jihad. For the last few years, in fact, we’ve seen others jockey for prominence as instigators of the jihad: note how Anwar al Awlaki was an inspiration for the Fort Hood shooter and for the Christmas Day underpants bomber.

In Winning the Unwinnable War I discuss at length what I believe we must do to achieve victory in this conflict. To put it briefly: we need to recognize the nature of the enemy, and then break its will to fight. That means using military coercion to fully demoralize the enemy so that all who share and seek to impose the Islamist ideals believe their cause is lost. We cannot begin to do that without confronting its leading exponents, notably the Iranian regime.

(P.S. ‘war on terror’ is not a term I favor; it muddles the issue.)

image: wiki commons

From the NYT.

In post-revolutionary Egypt, where hope and confusion collide in the daily struggle to build a new nation, religion has emerged as a powerful political force, following an uprising that was based on secular ideals. The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group once banned by the state, is at the forefront, transformed into a tacit partner with the military government that many fear will thwart fundamental changes.

It is also clear that the young, educated secular activists who initially propelled the nonideological revolution are no longer the driving political force — at least not at the moment.

As the best organized and most extensive opposition movement in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was expected to have an edge in the contest for influence. But what surprises many is its link to a military that vilified it. [emphasis added]

The article goes on to list a number of telling examples of “the Brotherhood’s rise and the overpowering force of Islam” in Egypt.

Of course, it is too early to know with confidence what will unfold in Egypt. But the broader point remains that in lands where Islam is woven into the fabric of the society, Islamists have the upper hand. The following examples speak for themselves.

Before [the recent referendum] a Brotherhood leader and spokesman, appeared on a popular television show, “The Reality,” arguing for the government’s position in favor of the proposal. With a record turnout, the vote was hailed as a success. But the “yes” campaign was based largely on a religious appeal: voters were warned that if they did not approve the amendments, Egypt would become a secular state.

“The problem is that our country will be without a religion,” read a flier distributed in Cairo by a group calling itself the Egyptian Revolution Society. “This means that the call to the prayer will not be heard anymore like in the case of Switzerland, women will be banned from wearing the hijab like in the case of France,” it said, referring to the Muslim head scarf. “And there will be laws that allow men to get married to men and women to get married to women like in the case of America.” [EJ: Count the distortions and half-truths here.]

A banner hung by the Muslim Brotherhood in a square in Alexandria instructed voters that it was their “religious duty” to vote “yes” on the amendments.

In the end, 77.2 percent of those who voted said yes.

image: flickr

Two brief thoughts about the international — actually, US-led — military campaign in Libya.

1. My view is that the campaign in Libya runs against genuine U.S. national interest — i.e., the protection of the lives and freedom of Americans. It has all the trappings of (and has been sold in part as) a humanitarian effort to quell the attacks by Gaddafi’s forces against the rebels. It’s far from clear why or how it is in our interest to do that. A so-called ‘humanitarian’ mission like that (as I argue in my book) risks sacrificing American lives and mires us in needless conflicts. What’s actually unfolding is a campaign without a clear objective or justification (unseating Gaddafi? yes? no? backing the rebels? both? who are the rebels and should we back them? what if there’s a prolonged civil war?). That should worry us profoundly.

2. There’s a glaring double standard in America’s (excuse for a) foreign policy in the Middle East. Consider the situation in Libya and the one in Iran. When massive protests took place in Iran during 2009/10, Washington was mute then grudging in its wishy-washy response; ultimately, it failed to lend the protesters even a shred of moral support against the militant, Islamist regime in Tehran, a regime that poses a demonstrable, existential threat to our interests. Contrast that with the response to the Libyan uprising (tribal civil war?). Yes, Gaddafi can be classified as a menace, but a trifling one, far less of a problem than the threat from Iran. Yet it is in Libya that America decides to take military action to back rebels against Gaddafi’s regime.

Let’s unpack that for a moment: we do move against a minor, tinpot dictatorship where we have little at stake, while leaving the fire-breathing Tehran regime in place — tacitly endorsing its rule by failing to help the protesters. We do launch bombing raids in Libya — if the UN and Arab League approve it — for the sake of rebels whose goals we don’t know if we share, against a regime that’s of minor significance to our security. But against a threat to us, from Iran, we adopt statue-like passivity.

Put another way: When our interests are at stake — as they were and are in Iran — we hold back and appease. When someone else’s interests appear to be on the line (the rebels and civilians in Libya), we dutifully scramble jet-fighters and put American lives in harm’s way, for the sake of serving others. Why? That double standard is rooted in the prevalent, and perverse, moral view that permeates our foreign policy — a view requiring that we put the needs of others ahead of our own goals and interests. Acting in accordance with that view — as I argue in my book — has been enormously destructive to American security and freedom, across decades.

Depressingly, under the guidance of that same view, our leaders are drawing us into a crisis called Libya.

image: flickr/US Navy

With Mubarak gone and elections on the horizon, Egypt’s revolutionaries are struggling to map out their political future. Problem One: What ideals do they actually stand for? What ideals does the populace actually stand for? This NYT report sketches out the precarious situation:

They [leaders of the protests] struggle to define a party that can appeal broadly to all Egyptians, including minority groups like the Copts, the Nubians and the Sinai Bedouins.

Take the idea of being a secular party. In recent years, the jihadists have successfully distorted the word “ilmani,” a direct translation of “secular,” into a synonym for “kufr” or infidel. “The word secular does not go over so well,” sighed Ms. Moore. Instead, they tell audiences that their goal is a modern, civil, democratic country.

But there’s one outfit that’s (literally) throwing a coming out party for itself—the deeply rooted Muslim Brotherhood.

Its members radiate barely suppressed glee that their moment has come, even though they have promised not to contest the presidency and to seek only 35 percent of the parliamentary seats.

How magnanimous of the Islamists to ease themselves in slowly! The whole story is must reading.

What’s on display here is the considerable advantage that Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood have, by virtue of the fact that their ideas resonate powerfully with many in the region. Anyone hoping to establish a political future in Egypt that comes a touch nearer to a truly secular, rights-respecting state faces a formidable task.

image: flickr/cc

Where the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain will lead remains a wide open question. But this perceptive NYT story weighs the plausible — and grave — scenario in which the Islamist regime in Iran may come out a big winner.

Iran already has considerable influence in Iraq and in Afghanistan; its proxy, Hezbollah, has enormous power in Lebanon. Hamas, which is backed by Iran, runs the Gaza Strip. As I explain in my book, the last 9+ years have seen Iran’s ominous ascent.

Now, given the upheaval in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, etc., consider what may ensue if Islamist — or even mildly pro-Iran — regimes take hold in those countries. That would advance the Tehran’s founding goal of exporting the odious ideals of its Islamist revolution across the region, and beyond. Imagine how much more emboldened Tehran would be if its dominion reached far across North Africa.

In the streets of Cairo, tens of thousands are clamoring to get rid of strongman Hosni Mubarak. Ominously the Muslim Brotherhood—the origin of Hamas, Al Qaeda and other jihadist outfits—is maneuvering to assume leadership of the protests. The Brotherhood is our enemy; its success in Egypt means greater peril for us (to put it mildly). But some protesters evidently despise the Brotherhood’s totalitarian political ideal. Where does that leave well-meaning Egyptians who want neither Mubarak nor the Brotherhood?

Beware of pinning your hopes on so-called political “moderates.” There are at least two related problems here.

1. In the Arab-Muslim world, the slippery term “moderate” encompasses those who are merely anti-Islamist–not necessarily pro-Western. Many Egyptians readily swallow anti-Semitic, anti-Western conspiracy theories (e.g. the Protocols of the Elders of Zion). Moreover, supporting Palestinian “resistance” (read: terrorism) against Israel is a conventional, mainstream, uncontroversial view. Egypt is one of the places where ordinary people matter-of-factly will tell you that America got what it deserved in the 9/11 attacks. Keep all that in mind, when you ponder what it would mean for so-called moderates to be elected into power in Egypt.

2. The other problem stems from the argument that so-called moderates can be a bulwark against the political power of Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. In that part of the world, the political spectrum is far narrower than you may think: whereas Islamists want religion to be the all-encompassing principle of government, a typical “moderate” still acknowledges that Islam has some, albeit limited, role in government. True secularists are scarce and marginal. So could “moderates” in government prevent the Islamists from taking over? Ultimately, no. I touch on this in my book, and here’s part of the explanation.

The only intelligible meaning of “moderate” advocates of religion are those who try to combine devotion to faith with concessions to reason. They obey the dictates of Islam in some areas and not others, fencing off certain issues or areas of life from the purview of religion. Let us grant the premise that the West can find moderate Muslims and support them in a way that does not discredit them in Muslim eyes as saboteurs conspiring to undermine Islam. Could moderates really steer their culture away from the totalitarian movement?

The holy warriors hold that Islam must shape every last detail of man’s life. The moderates accept the ideal of Islam but shy away from the vision of total state. Moderates might agree to allow sharia to govern schools, say, but not commerce; to dictate marriage laws, but not punishments for blasphemy, apostasy, or adultery. Yet in doing so, moderates ultimately advance the agenda of the totalitarians, since even delimited applications of Islam to government constitute an endorsement of it as the proper source of law.

The tension between moderates and the totalitarians is unsustainable. What happens when the totalitarians push for expanding the scope of sharia a bit more? If sharia can govern banking and trade, for example, why not other aspects of life? Why not also institute Islamic punishments, such as beheading apostates? Having accepted in principle the ideal of sharia, moderates have no grounds to reject further means to that end. They can offer no principled opposition to the slaughter of infidels who refuse to submit, or of apostates who claim the freedom to choose their own convictions. In the face of the incremental or rapid advance of the totalitarian goal, the moderates are in the long run impotent. If Islam is the ideal, why practice it in moderation?

One news report tells us that the ostensibly “moderate” Mohammad ElBaradei has talked about setting up a governing coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood.

The plight of Egypt — like that of much of the region — is intellectual. The protestors who genuinely do want a better future face no good options.

(P.S. What could help Egyptians? To address that fully would take a separate discussion. At minimum, I’d name three things: the embrace of genuinely pro-freedom ideas, secular government and individualism.)

image: flicker/cc

With a new year approaching, we looked back at some of the topics we discussed on VFR since the blog was launched. Here, we highlight a few of our favorite VFR posts that you may enjoy revisiting (or reading for the first time, if you’re a new reader).

Posts by Elan Journo.

• Disconnected Dots
• McChrystal’s other — deadly — scandal
• Draw Mohammad, risk your life?
• Iraq’s Awakening re-awakens pro-jihadist. Shocking.

image: cc/yoshiffles

Back in October, I was interviewed on PJTV about the Stuxnet “worm,” which had reportedly sabotaged two of Iran’s (sinister) nuclear facilities. At the time, it seemed that worm — a self-replicating computer malware program — had been crafted specifically to cripple the computer systems at the Iranian facilities. Now, more signs have emerged that the “worm” is continuing to subvert Iran’s facilities.

Though Stuxnet remains enigmatic, this article caught my eye because it sketches in a few more facts about Stuxnet. In particular, the article lays out what investigators have learned so far about the worm’s sophisticated self-concealment and pinpoint targeting. For instance:

Masking itself from the [nuclear] plant’s security and other systems, the worm then ordered the centrifuges to rotate extremely fast, and then to slow down precipitously. This damaged the converter, the centrifuges and the bearings, and it corrupted the uranium in the tubes. It also left Iranian nuclear engineers wondering what was wrong, as computer checks showed no malfunctions in the operating system.

Estimates are that this went on for more than a year, leaving the Iranian program in chaos. And as it did, the worm grew and adapted throughout the system. As new worms entered the system, they would meet and adapt and become increasingly sophisticated.

… the worm was designed to allow the Iranian program to continue but never succeed, and never to know why. [The whole thing is worth reading.]

Two quick comments: 1. There are some scarily brilliant minds behind the design and implementation of the Stuxnet worm. If indeed it is a U.S.-backed, calculated cyber attack on Iran’s facilities, I would applaud the folks who created it. 2. Is sabotaging Iran’s nuclear program enough to safeguard us? It buys us time — and that’s a good thing — but we must remember that the threat from Iran is broader than just its nuclear ambitions.
image: sxc.hu/stevenafc

This poll, if accurate, is truly damning — not only of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, but also of Afghans’ ideas. Last year, some 8 percent of Afghans said that insurgent attacks on US/Nato forces can be justified. This year, twenty-seven percent of Afghans polled said the attacks can be justified.

What makes this three-fold increase so astounding is that it comes after continual ratcheting up of restrictions on when U.S. troops in Afghanistan are permitted to use deadly force. Our soldiers are far, far more limited in when they can call in air support, for example, than just a couple of years ago (when their hands were still fairly tied). Yet for years, the premise of our strategy has been that, the more we tiptoe, appease the locals, and pull our punches, the more likely we are to win the love of the population. But in fact, pursuing this self-crippled policy (as I note in my book) leads our enemies and their sympathizers to feel contempt, if not greater enmity, for us.

Notice, moreover, that there’s been 31 percent increase in civilian deaths in the first six months of the year — “largely caused by Taliban attacks, according to the United Nations” (casualties attributed to Western forces have declined). And yet, 73 percent favor a “negotiated settlement” with the totalitarian Taliban/Islamist groups.

What does that say about the ideological sympathies of Afghans? What does it say about the assumptions behind U.S. policy in the region?