Foreign Policy — VOICES for REASON

Dispelling misconceptions about the Arab/Israeli conflict is a focus of Efraim Karsh’s writings, and in his oped in today’s NYT, he brings to a wider audience key facts about the character of self-professed Arab champions of the Palestinian cause. He lays out a historical case that Arab states — who routinely jockey to be seen as advancing Palestinian goals — have in reality exploited that cause for their own power-seeking ends.

Agreeing with the thrust of Karsh’s article, I’d add this point: even if these backers had been genuine in their motivations and truly sought to serve the cause, that too would be deplorable. From my reading of the issue, the Palestinian movement has at its root an antipathy to Western political values, such individual freedom, and it has pioneered in the vile tactic of terrorism. Regimes that back that movement, for whatever reason, are complicit in its aggression.

(I explore the Palestinian movement and its goals in a course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In chapter seven of Winning the Unwinnable War, I touch on a prevailing dynamic in Mideast politics that sheds light on what motivates contemporary backers of the Palestinians (e.g., Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia).)

Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s Rolling Stone interview has created a scandal–but the real scandal we should be talking about is his Afghanistan strategy and how it needlessly imperils American lives.

Under his widely acclaimed counterinsurgency strategy, McChrystal “shifted the risks from Afghan civilians to Western combatants,” reports the NYT.  Translation: the rules place the lives and welfare of Afghans —  emphatically including the Islamist warriors we’re supposed to be fighting — ahead of American lives. Consider:

Before the rules were tightened, one Army major who had commanded an infantry company said, “firefights in Afghanistan had a half-life.” By this he meant that skirmishes often were brief, lasting roughly a half-hour. The Taliban would ambush patrols and typically break contact and slip away as patrol leaders organized and escalated Western firepower in response.

Now, with fire support often restricted, or even idled, Taliban fighters seem noticeably less worried about an American response, many soldiers and Marines say. Firefights often drag on, sometimes lasting hours, and costing lives. The United States’ material advantages are not robustly applied; troops are engaged in rifle-on-rifle fights on their enemy’s turf. [emphasis added]

I’ve argued in Winning the Unwinnable War and in talks around the country that this policy is self-crippling and morally perverse. And the policy is still in full-effect, as the experiences of soldiers on the ground can attest to.

Several infantrymen have also said that the rules are so restrictive that pilots are often not allowed to attack fixed targets — say, a building or tree line from which troops are taking fire — unless they can personally see the insurgents doing the firing.

This has lead to situations many soldiers describe as absurd, including decisions by patrol leaders to have fellow soldiers move briefly out into the open to draw fire once aircraft arrive, so the pilots might be cleared to participate in the fight. [emphasis added]

All of which confers an inestimable tactical advantage on Taliban fighters — “making it easier for them to hide to fight, to meet and to store their weapons or assemble their makeshift bombs.” Meanwhile, U.S. troops — with justified indignation — speak of “‘being handcuffed,’ of not being trusted by their bosses and of being asked to battle a canny and vicious insurgency ‘in a fair fight.’” How many more must return home in coffins, because they were purposely hamstrung in combat?

By all means, question McChrystal’s judgment in making derisive comments about his boss, the Commander in Chief. But isn’t it past time to question the propriety of an Afghan strategy that both endorse?

image: wiki commons

The U.N. is about to pass another round of sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. Is it despite the three earlier rounds of U.N. sanctions that Iran has geared up to produce even more nuclear material — or because of them?

Past sanctions were puny to begin with, then eviscerated by friends of Tehran at the U.N. (Predictably, the regime has sidestepped existing sanctions.) But even if credibly effective sanctions could be imposed — which at the U.N. is fantastical — Iran’s decades of pro-jihadist aggression demand a far more assertive response. Tehran is a belligerent theocracy stained with American blood. Ending the mounting threat from Iran requires a resolute, confident policy on our part, but by pursuing mousy “sanctions” and extending Tehran countless second chances, we’ve appeased the regime.

No wonder Iran’s leaders (credibly) brag of realizing their nuclear goals. Our weakness in the face of this malignant regime empowers it.

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Since Israel forcibly intercepted ships heading to Gaza with “humanitarian” aid, the choir of condemnation has shrieked in unison — from the UK, and most of the European continent, across the Atlantic to the bowels of the U.N. But putting aside questions on the laws governing international waters, was Israel morally right to prevent the ships from reaching Gaza? Yes–I’d argue it was fully within its rights to enforce the naval blockade on Gaza.

To judge Israel’s actions, it is crucial to recognize the broader context: the Gaza strip is under the control of Hamas, a totalitarian Islamist group, that is at war with Israel. Allowing arms, money, and other forms of aid to enter Hamas-controlled Gaza means allowing a sworn enemy to be sustained and strengthened to fight on. And a state facing that situation is entitled to thwart attempts to aid its enemy.

P.S. A word on the blockade itself. My view is that Israel is entitled to seal Gaza off from the world. Is that the most efficient means of thwarting, let alone minimizing, the threat from Hamas? I doubt it — in part because exceptions are often made for so-called humanitarian supplies. Should Israel act assertively to remove the Islamist group from power and dismantle its infrastructure in the Palestinian territories? That’s a point I’ve argued in other places.

Fortunately, the three tanks of propane and two jugs of gasoline in the back of the Nissan Pathfinder failed to blow up. It remains to be seen who is behind the Times Square bomb plot; the arrest of a suspect — a Pakistani native — may bring more details to light. But looking at the evidence left behind in the truck and contemplating the bombmaker’s mindset, one expert remarked: “I can tell you that [the bomber(s)] thought it was the atomic bomb.” The bomber(s) “have more desire than ability.”

A desire for destruction of human life on a large scale definitely fits the m.o. of Islamic totalitarianism, the ideological movement behind the 9/11 attacks (among others). It figures, then, that one Taliban outfit in Pakistan has leapt to claim responsibility for the attempted car-bombing in Times Square. The claim may prove to be mere propaganda to win a perverse cachet within the movement, but if it is unfounded, it nevertheless underscores their wish to bring their holy war (back) to our shores.

image: flickr

In his New York Times column, Ross Douthat recounts the backstory behind the death threat—posted on a Muslim website—against the producers of “South Park” and discerns a broader issue. He argues plausibly that Comedy Central’s decision to bleep out references to “Mohammad” and remove the supposedly offending episode is part of a larger pattern of self-censorship in our culture.

What concerns him is the apparent lopsidedness of the self-censorship: practically every value and idea today is subject to criticism in popular culture, whereas the “South Park” incident is “a reminder that Islam is just about the only place where we draw any lines at all.” There’s something to that observation (though I don’t subscribe to Douthat’s explanation of it); but I want to put that aside for the moment to isolate a widely ignored, and broader, point. What he and others who echo this line overlook (or evade?) is that self-censorship in North America and (to a far greater degree in) Europe is in significant part a function of governments’ failure to uphold the freedom of speech.

The guardian of that right is the government — and it’s AWOL. To put it mildly.

The pattern we’ve witnessed in previous crises—from the death decree against author Salman Rushdie in 1989 to the Danish cartoons crisis, and similar cases—is the refusal of our political leaders to defend us against threats to our freedom of speech. Worse: we’ve seen them genuflecting before and seeking to appease aggressive Muslim activists and their backers. (I touch on this in Winning the Unwinnable War.) Yes, there have been publishers and TV networks and bookstores that exhibited fear, and perhaps cowardice, in the face of such threats. But when our government issues limp, apologetic statements mollifying the aggressors—and effectively leaves writers, publishers, filmmakers and everyone else unprotected from the threat of reprisals by would-be Islamist enforcers—is it surprising that self-censorship grows?

The U.S. is not only a founding member of the U.N. but for a long time has been its largest financial backer. What are we getting for our money? An institution that makes a mockery of protecting rights around the world. Consider this report from veteran U.N. observer Anne Bayefsky, cataloguing just some of the recent perversities of the U.N.’s (notorious) Human Rights Council.

The Council, which meets in Geneva, is the personal playground of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. They hold the balance of power by controlling the Asian and African regional groups, which together form a majority at the Council. The Council’s agenda is accordingly fixated on issues of priority to the Islamic bloc— number one, delegitimizing Israel; number two, trumping free speech in the name of Islam; and number three, avoiding any criticism of human-rights violations in their own backyards. None of which has anything to do with protecting human rights.

Later, Bayefsky observes, “The Obama administration lost every time it called for the vote on a resolution at the Council session.” But don’t be misled into thinking that Obama’s diplomats were all that energetic. Read the rest of this entry »

In the modern era, it is common to hear people put forward the view that in war, “the pursuit of victory would necessarily create new grievances and guarantee an even more destructive conflict in the future.” We hear versions of that invoked all over the place — it is, for instance, central to the rationale for America’s nation-building strategy in Afghanistan. But this idea deserves to be questioned in light of empirical evidence. In his new book, Nothing Less than Victory, Dr. John David Lewis takes on that question (among others) from a historical perspective. He considers “six major wars in which a clear-cut victory did not lead to longer and bloodier war, but rather established the foundations of long-term peace between former enemies,” and looks at how and why those successes were achieved.

Over the last few years, I’ve had the opportunity of hearing Prof. Lewis present his analyses of major wars in history, and every time I’ve come away tremendously impressed with his scholarship. This book examines major conflicts in the ancient world (including the Greco-Persian Wars and the Theban Wars) as well as three episodes that may be better known today: General Sherman’s march through the American south during the Civil War; the lead-up to World War II; and the U.S. victory over Japan in 1945. My copy arrived recently, and I’m eagerly looking forward to seeing how he weaves together the threads of his argument.

Kudos to Prof. Lewis for bringing this important volume to light.

Thursday marks the 31st anniversary of the coalescing of Iran’s Islamist revolution. But on this deeply symbolic day, which Tehran usually spends glorifying its militant, tyrannical rule, millions of Iranian citizens will likely attempt another show of mass defiance and repudiation of the regime.

That’s precisely what Tehran fears. It fears having its veneer of popular endorsement torn away altogether. Witness its preemptive crack down. Critics and student activists have been rounded up and tossed in prison. Earlier this month, to build up the intimidation factor, the regime began executing dissidents. The IranTracker project is compiling a record of Tehran’s intimidation tactics in the run-up to the day. The list is horrifyingly long.

Read the rest of this entry »

Over at AEI’s blog, Danielle Pletka detects signs that the Obama administration is changing its approach toward Iran. After getting nowhere with attempts to lure Iran into negotiations, suddenly “the administration has started pouring it on from all spigots: sending Patriot batteries to Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait, lengthening deployments to the Gulf, and otherwise talking up the stakes. So what’s the deal? Is Iran a major threat to the United States and our allies? Did this suddenly dawn on the administration?  . . . Hint: Something has changed. Second hint: It’s not Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. About time too.”

Allow me to register a dissenting perspective.

Obama’s so-called diplomatic outreach has treated Iran as a morally worthy interlocutor and estranged friend, whose goodwill it is our duty to cultivate. And that entire initiative is predicated on evading Iran’s bloody record and militant ideal of global Islamist rule. It’s a long way to go from that to a clear-eyed recognition of the regime’s character.  Obama would have to do, and publicly say, a lot more to convince me — let alone convince Tehran — that the administration now views the regime as fundamentally hostile and is willing to use military force to eliminate the threat it poses. Everything our president has done since taking office has reinforced the contrary view.

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