Pakistan — VOICES for REASON

He’s been denounced for his “heinous role as maestro of the world’s largest nuclear black market” and branded “the merchant of death,” but new, more alarming details have emerged in the dark story of A.Q. Khan. A Pakistani nuclear scientist, Khan was charged with illicitly trading nuclear technology. The standard account portrayed him as a rogue scientist out for his own gain and operating independently of the Pakistani regime. But now it appears he was a dutiful servant of the Pakistani regime (our purported ally).

Read the rest of this entry »

After interviewing high-up officials in Pakistan’s military for two hours, the New York Times’s reporters came away with this gem: “Dialogue with the Taliban, not more fighting, is in Pakistan’s national interest, they said.” What’s more: the Pakistani regime is unhappy about the American military efforts against Islamists in next-door Afghanistan. Why? The fighting has resulted in some of the Islamists crossing the border into parts of Pakistan. Translation: quit bothering the Taliban across the border, and quit bothering us about fighting them within Pakistani borders.

Note that Pakistan’s army gets some $1 billion in U.S. aid every year, and that our forces work closely with Pakistan’s military to target Islamists. Officials in the Obama administration praise these operations, though they complain that:

… Pakistani authorities have chosen to fight Pakistani Taliban who threaten their government, while ignoring Taliban and other militants fighting Americans in Afghanistan or terrorizing India. …

[American officials believe] Pakistan was still picking proxies and choosing enemies among various Islamic militant groups in Pakistan.

The United States maintains that the Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, leads an inner circle of commanders who guide the war in southern Afghanistan from their base in Quetta [a city in Pakistan].

When will the weight of evidence impugning Pakistan be sufficient to overturn the belief (esp. in Washington) that it is our ally — and lead us to change our policy toward it? Its record has been abysmal. And its “dialogue with the Taliban” has worked splendidly — for the Taliban. Just look at the deal enabling Islamists to impose sharia in the Swat Valley of Pakistan. But perhaps no amount of evidence will be enough. For the idea that Pakistan is our friend — or even  that it is the enemy of our enemy (i.e., the Islamist movement) — belongs in the realm of make-believe. The Obama policy of self-delusion on Pakistan — continuing in the footsteps of Bush — will cost us dearly.

Sixty miles. That’s how close the insurgent Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have come to the capital city of Pakistan, Islamabad. The gains of these Islamist fighters — along with the broader strife along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border — prompts the question: could jihadists get hold of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons? Perhaps so.

To me one of the most worrisome indicators is the idea that we can trust the Pakistani regime to lockdown its nuclear arsenal (or trust it to do anything else it promises). Monday’s NYT indicates the official line from Washington — and some of the facts that belie it.

Read the rest of this entry »

“Every day I see armed Taliban move around freely. At the time of prayer, if they see anyone in his shop or walking about, they whip him with a stick,” said a resident of the Swat Valley in Pakistan. Yet those who are whipped can count themselves lucky by comparison with a man and woman who were executed for the alleged crime of adultery. This is the grisly reality of Islamist rule now swallowing up chunks of Pakistan.

The brazenness of the Islamists is astounding; the other day the Taliban stopped a Pakistani Army convoy heading into Swat and forced it to turn back. In large measure this confidence stems from the so-called peace deal that allows them to enforce sharia law in Swat Valley.

But the Pakistani government’s surrender has had another, little noted, effect: it has understandably demoralized many Pakistani citizens. This poignant story in the NYT sheds light on the experience of people in the area of Buner. There are also reports that people elsewhere are contemplating an exodus, for fear of what will become of their lives under Islamist rule.

I’m not sure which has a greater demoralizing effect on the innocents in Pakistan–the growing strength of the Islamists, or their national government’s capitulation (and perfunctory military responses). My sense is that it’s the latter, because it enables the gains of so vile a movement as the Taliban.

What might Pakistan look like in the years to come? The nuclear-armed country may well look a lot like Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

Sounds like hyperbole? Consider the trend now unfolding in Pakistan: the national government struck a so-called peace agreement with Islamist kingpins in the North. In return for promising to end jihadist attacks within Pakistan, the Islamists were given the power to enforce sharia (Islamic law) in the Swat Valley. The Pakistani government recently signed this agreement into law. But as a Washington Post subhead puts it, “After Reaching Deal in North, Islamists Aim to Install Religious Law Nationwide.”

Several months back, when the deal was announced, I suggested that it was an outright surrender. Instead of living up to its stated goal of opposing the Islamists, by defeating them militarily, Islamabad has opted for the losing policy of appeasement — a policy that can only strengthen the jihadists. One concerned observer, a prof at Quaid-i-Azam university, told the Post that “The [national] government made a big mistake to give these guys legal cover for their agenda.”

It’s far worse than that. Read the rest of this entry »

Regarding the newly announced Obama strategy for Afghanistan-Pakistan, I argued (in part one) that the administration’s solution is based on a misdiagnosis of the problem. Last time I focused on how the Afghanistan war was guided by a “compassionate” strategy that put concern for the welfare of Afghans ahead of the necessary goal of defeating the enemy. But in his speech, Obama assured the Islamists (which he evasively terms “terrorists”) that “we will defeat you.”

If only that were the focus of his strategy. But it’s not.

Read the rest of this entry »

In a speech announcing his “comprehensive, new strategy” for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Obama warned that “The situation is increasingly perilous. It has been more than seven years since the Taliban was removed from power, yet war rages on, and insurgents control parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Attacks against our troops, our NATO allies, and the Afghan government have risen steadily. Most painfully, 2008 was the deadliest year of the war for American forces.” He may well have been understating the magnitude of the problem, particularly in Pakistan (consider this recent brazen attack). And while both liberals and some conservatives have commended Obama’s strategy (with minor qualifications), I regard it as fundamentally misconceived.

Read the rest of this entry »

The New York Times leads with a frightening, but hardly surprising, report on how Pakistan has accepted “a system of Islamic law in the Swat valley and agreed to a truce” with jihadists there, “effectively conceding the area as a Taliban sanctuary and suspending a faltering effort by the army to crush the insurgents.” Pakistan’s surrender was telegraphed by prior appeasing deals (see these three stories for a sampling)–and probably there will be more to come.

For a sense of the threat emanating from Pakistan, and particularly the lawless tribal areas, consider the words of (former) CIA director Michael Hayden: “Today, virtually every major terrorist threat my agency is aware of has threads back to the tribal areas.” Now project what a huge morale-boost this latest capitulation will give Islamists operating in Pakistan and elsewhere.

The policy of appeasing Islamists has sometimes been rationalized on the grounds that the military option–defeating the enemy–has been tried and failed. (E.g. the view of this British general, which is echoed throughout the West, regarding the related Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.) But has war as such been discredited as an option?

Far from it. I’ve argued against that misconception; the supposed proof of this idea rests heavily on the experience of the Iraq war, but that fiasco was nothing like what a real war looks like. And the point applies even more so in the case of Pakistan’s perfunctory military efforts.

On paper, at least, the United States and Pakistan are allies, but it’s a seriously troubled relationship–to put things mildly. Take, for instance, Pakistan’s past sponsorship of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its ongoing close ties to Islamists (a subject for future posts). Yet another red flag: the case of A.Q. Khan, a scientist who helped develop Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Khan gained notoriety in the West when he was busted for illicitly selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, North Korea and perhaps others. So you might expect that the Pakistani regime would at least hand him a punishment commensurate with his actions–but Khan, who is something of a folk hero, was placed under house arrest. Now comes news that Pakistan’s government has released Khan from house arrest (with some minor restrictions).

The signs keep pointing to the conclusion that the U.S.-Pakistan alliance was built on a great deal of American self-delusion. I’ve argued that our policymakers plunged us into this messy, harmful relationship, in large part because they failed to judge Pakistan objectively. It didn’t have to be this way, and we could turn things around, but not until we face up to what we’re dealing with.