Iran — VOICES for REASON

What’s often forgotten (or ignored?) about the Iranian nuclear program is that Tehran has advanced this far despite being subject to numerous sanctions for many years. There’s now a strong push in Congress to amp up economic sanctions on the regime. In Foreign Policy, Mark Dubowitz and Jonathan Schanzer discuss Iran’s use of an international financial-transactions system, and argue that severing Tehran’s link to that system could seriously disrupt its ability to engage in trade. Definitely worth reading.

My take is that further sanctions, if really effectual, could help disrupt or slow down Iran’s program, but I continue to maintain that eliminating the threat from that regime will require far more — at this point, almost certainly military coercion.

image:sxc.hu

The rhetoric: Following the busting of an Iranian plot to kill a Saudi envoy in Washington, the Obama administration promised to pursue the “toughest sanctions.”

The reality: a New York Times headline sums up: “U.S. talks tough to Iran, but Holds Off on Harsher Moves.” The story goes on: “Despite issuing harsh calls for Tehran to be held to account, the Obama administration does not plan to shift its policy of pressure on the Iranian government.”

What’s fascinating here is twofold: (1) Iran is already enmeshed in an intricate web of “tough” sanctions going back many years, accomplishing little. (2) Even if truly effective sanctions were an appropriate response (it’s not even remotely enough), it’s utterly pathetic that the chances of actually imposing them are next to nil. That’s because Iran’s friends at the United Nations will likely undercut or scuttle a U.S.-led push for sanctions, just as they have done in the past.

Tehran is a regime that has already demonstrated a staggering degree of temerity and militancy: just think of its three-decades-long record of lethal attacks on Americans and U.S. interests. What effect will U.S. rhetoric and non-action have on it? We’ve seen that movie before. That policy of appeasement through inaction has brought us here.

What we should do in response requires a separate discussion, but at minimum, contemplate what a truly resolute, self-assertive U.S. policy would begin with: a frank reckoning of Iran’s militant character and malignant goals. Establishing that kind of moral clarity is a necessary condition for enabling us to confront the threat from the regime.

image: flickr

Last month in Washington D.C., ARC hosted a symposium to explore American foreign policy in the post-9/11 decade. For those who were unable to attend live or to watch the live streamed video, below are the videos of the three panel discussions.

Upheavals in the Middle East: Assessing the political landscape

The Islamist Threat: From AfPak to Jyllands-Posten and Times Square

Iran, Israel and the West

The economic downturn, the deficit and debt crisis, the struggle businesses have in making payroll, the challenge many people now face to find work — all of these issues, naturally, are front-and-center in the headlines, on Main Street, on Capitol Hill, on the campaign trail. Foreign policy — despite the tumult in the Middle East — has receded from public awareness. It’s understandable, for example, that people’s interest in Iraq and Afghanistan should wane. Consider how Iraq and Afghanistan have turned out — nearly a decade later, neither has been the success we were led to expect. But there’s a real danger in turning our attention away from foreign policy: the threats we face continue to grow.

Take one major example: Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability. In a column at the New York Post, Peter Brookes helpfully spells out the latest dismaying news about Iran. He writes that “despite all the bloviating, finger-wagging and sloppy United Nations sanctions, there doesn’t seem to be much — if anything — holding back the ayatollahs’ atomic aspirations.”

…Iran is outfitting its new nuclear facility at Qom with new centrifuges — which experts believe will permit it to further increase uranium-enrichment levels far beyond what’s needed for peaceful nuclear-reactor fuel.

The “fissile fortress” at Qom — located on a Revolutionary Guard base and securely tucked into the side of a mountain — is pretty clearly meant to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for the making of Iran’s first bombs.

It’s been estimated Iran already has enough low-enriched uranium on hand to produce enough highly enriched uranium for two to three bombs in relatively short order. And the IAEA (from its own detective work and intel provided by members) has “increasing concern” that Iran’s peaceful nuclear program has a military angle.

That is, the IAEA fears Tehran is working on a nuke warhead to put that uranium in.

Bear in mind that this news comes from an IAEA report, and that the organization (in Brookes’s aptly phrase) is “always-cautious-and-slow-to-accuse.”

image: wiki commons

If you haven’t yet checked out Elan Journo’s edited collection, Winning the Unwinnable War: America’s Self-Crippled Response to Islamic Totalitarianism, this month you can read the introduction and first two chapters of the book for free here.

Winning the Unwinnable War analyzes U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East since 9/11.

From the book’s introduction:

Chapter 1 [titled "The Road to 9/11"] demonstrates how unprincipled U.S. policy–from Carter through Clinton–worked to galvanize the enemy to bring its holy war to our shores on 9/11. Chapter 2 [titled "What Motivates the Jihad on America"] explores the widely evaded nature and goals of the enemy, and indicates how that should figure in America’s military response.

You can buy the book here.

It has been a decade since the Sept. 11 attacks shocked and angered our nation. What lessons have we learned since then? ARC will be hosting a symposium on this subject, titled “Sept. 11—A Decade Later: Lessons for the Future,” on September 8, in Washington, D.C. The program will feature three panel discussions, presenting a range of viewpoints.

If you can’t make this event, it will also be streamed live over the web starting at 1p.m. ET.

Check out the panel topics and speakers on the event’s site. You can also watch the live stream of the event from there.

On ARC’s Facebook page, you can read, watch, and listen to ARI’s numerous efforts throughout the last decade to push for an egoist foreign policy that puts the lives and individual rights of Americans first.

A couple of years back, I noted some tentative indications that the White House wanted to “engage” with Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Islamist group that exerts enormous power in Lebanon. Now, writes Omri Ceren at Contentions, “There are a number of signs the Obama White House is ready to establish something more than a modus vivendi with Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon.” Who are we dealing with? To illustrate the nature of Hezbollah, he relates one dreadful — and representative — episode from its long, bloody history: the kidnapping and torture to death of CIA Lebanon Station Chief William Buckley. Keep that searing episode in mind when you contemplate the suggestion that we should sit down to tea with the likes of Hezbollah.

image: wikipedia/CC

The killing of Bin Laden is a tremendous act of justice — for the victims of 9/11, for all Americans. An overdue act of justice, but a necessary and expertly conducted one nonetheless. In the last 12 hours, on lots of radio interviews, I’ve been asked: “Can we now bury the ‘war on terror’?”

No. Although Bin Laden was the the most recognized face of Islamist terrorism, al Qaeda is one, relatively recent, faction within a larger ideological-political cause: the Islamic totalitarian movement. That movement’s origins date back to the 1920s with the founding of

the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; its standard-bearer since 1979 has been the totalitarian regime in Iran. The Islamists wish to establish a global regime that subjugates all under sharia. There is disagreement within the movement on how to achieve that goal—terrorist attacks, revolutionary overthrow, lawful political subversion, running for elected office, or some combination of these.

But whatever the means adopted, their common vision necessitates expunging the freedom of individuals and negating the political principles of secular society.

It was essential that we capture or kill Bin Laden, in the name of justice, but that step alone cannot put an end to the movement. We can hope that it will demoralize some of Bin Laden’s many admirers and followers, for a while, but we should also expect someone else to emerge, hydra-like, to serve as a leader of the jihad. For the last few years, in fact, we’ve seen others jockey for prominence as instigators of the jihad: note how Anwar al Awlaki was an inspiration for the Fort Hood shooter and for the Christmas Day underpants bomber.

In Winning the Unwinnable War I discuss at length what I believe we must do to achieve victory in this conflict. To put it briefly: we need to recognize the nature of the enemy, and then break its will to fight. That means using military coercion to fully demoralize the enemy so that all who share and seek to impose the Islamist ideals believe their cause is lost. We cannot begin to do that without confronting its leading exponents, notably the Iranian regime.

(P.S. ‘war on terror’ is not a term I favor; it muddles the issue.)

image: wiki commons

Two brief thoughts about the international — actually, US-led — military campaign in Libya.

1. My view is that the campaign in Libya runs against genuine U.S. national interest — i.e., the protection of the lives and freedom of Americans. It has all the trappings of (and has been sold in part as) a humanitarian effort to quell the attacks by Gaddafi’s forces against the rebels. It’s far from clear why or how it is in our interest to do that. A so-called ‘humanitarian’ mission like that (as I argue in my book) risks sacrificing American lives and mires us in needless conflicts. What’s actually unfolding is a campaign without a clear objective or justification (unseating Gaddafi? yes? no? backing the rebels? both? who are the rebels and should we back them? what if there’s a prolonged civil war?). That should worry us profoundly.

2. There’s a glaring double standard in America’s (excuse for a) foreign policy in the Middle East. Consider the situation in Libya and the one in Iran. When massive protests took place in Iran during 2009/10, Washington was mute then grudging in its wishy-washy response; ultimately, it failed to lend the protesters even a shred of moral support against the militant, Islamist regime in Tehran, a regime that poses a demonstrable, existential threat to our interests. Contrast that with the response to the Libyan uprising (tribal civil war?). Yes, Gaddafi can be classified as a menace, but a trifling one, far less of a problem than the threat from Iran. Yet it is in Libya that America decides to take military action to back rebels against Gaddafi’s regime.

Let’s unpack that for a moment: we do move against a minor, tinpot dictatorship where we have little at stake, while leaving the fire-breathing Tehran regime in place — tacitly endorsing its rule by failing to help the protesters. We do launch bombing raids in Libya — if the UN and Arab League approve it — for the sake of rebels whose goals we don’t know if we share, against a regime that’s of minor significance to our security. But against a threat to us, from Iran, we adopt statue-like passivity.

Put another way: When our interests are at stake — as they were and are in Iran — we hold back and appease. When someone else’s interests appear to be on the line (the rebels and civilians in Libya), we dutifully scramble jet-fighters and put American lives in harm’s way, for the sake of serving others. Why? That double standard is rooted in the prevalent, and perverse, moral view that permeates our foreign policy — a view requiring that we put the needs of others ahead of our own goals and interests. Acting in accordance with that view — as I argue in my book — has been enormously destructive to American security and freedom, across decades.

Depressingly, under the guidance of that same view, our leaders are drawing us into a crisis called Libya.

image: flickr/US Navy

Where the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain will lead remains a wide open question. But this perceptive NYT story weighs the plausible — and grave — scenario in which the Islamist regime in Iran may come out a big winner.

Iran already has considerable influence in Iraq and in Afghanistan; its proxy, Hezbollah, has enormous power in Lebanon. Hamas, which is backed by Iran, runs the Gaza Strip. As I explain in my book, the last 9+ years have seen Iran’s ominous ascent.

Now, given the upheaval in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, etc., consider what may ensue if Islamist — or even mildly pro-Iran — regimes take hold in those countries. That would advance the Tehran’s founding goal of exporting the odious ideals of its Islamist revolution across the region, and beyond. Imagine how much more emboldened Tehran would be if its dominion reached far across North Africa.